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LOW PROBABILITY/HIGH CONSEQUENCE EVENTS:
DILEMMAS OF DAMAGE COMPENSATION
Richard Lempert*
INTRODUcrION
This year's Clifford Symposium topic is a particularly daunting one:
The Challenge of 2020: Preparing a Civil Justice Reform Agenda for
the Coming Decade. It requires us to imagine a world that does not
now exist and to anticipate social conditions and salient issues a dozen
years hence. We could be living in a world at war or at peace-one in
which the United States economy has rebounded and is again the
strongest in the world or one in which the United States remains in
the economic doldrums for years. Our social insurance schemes could
be the same, or we might have universal health insurance, a reform
that would alter radically both the need for tort compensation and the
way tort litigation is constructed. In short, systems must be designed
for the societies in which they are found, and not knowing what soci-
ety will look like in the year 2020, setting a reform agenda requires
considerable guess work.
But if everyone's task is daunting, mine is particularly so, for I am
supposed to discuss not only how the tort system will prepare itself to
confront problems arising twelve years in the future, but also how the
tort system will address those problems that are hardest to antici-
pate-very low probability/very high consequence events. Indeed, so
speculative is my topic that it barely fits into the symposium. Hence, I
hope you will bear with me if what I write is more speculative than the
other symposium papers.
While it is impossible to know exactly what problems will confront
the tort system in the year 2020, much less those very low probability/
very high consequence events that will occur, we can be sure some
such events will happen if for no other reason than that we have had
recent experience with several of them. Four stand out: the escape of
* Richard Lempert is the Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociol-
ogy, emeritus at the University of Michigan. He is currently Basic Research Deputy and Chief
Scientist in the Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division of the Science and Technology Di-
rectorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). All opinions expressed in this Arti-
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radiation from Three Mile Island, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001, and the flooding of New Orleans.'
Before turning to these events, however, and before trying to imagine
how the tort system might be reformed-if it can or even should be
reformed-to deal with such events, we should first consider the con-
ditions that make a tort system work well. 2
II. ORDINARY TORTS
First, those who tortiously cause injury to others must be able to
pay for the harm caused; otherwise, the tort remedy is an empty one.
Second, transaction costs should be low. If they are not, then consid-
erable money will be spent beyond what is needed to compensate for
injuries. Expenditures will impoverish defendants beyond the costs of
the harm they caused, or awards will undercompensate plaintiffs, or
both. One implication is that the system works best when liability is
easiest to determine, for in these circumstances obligations are clear
and little money need be spent establishing who owes what to whom.
Third, the injury causing behavior should not be entirely accidental or,
to the extent it is, the accident should have been made more probable
by the way in which a situation was structured. This requirement may
seem counterintuitive because we tend to think of tort law as provid-
ing remedies for accidentally caused harms, but this condition must
exist for a major justification for tort law-the deterrence of harm-to
be realized. If harm-causing acts were random, inevitable occurrences
and systems could not be designed or care taken to reduce the likeli-
hood of harm, then although tort law could still fill its loss shifting
function, it could not reduce the probability of future harmful behav-
ior. Hence, a major justification for allowing tort recovery, and for
systems of strict liability in particular, would be lost.
Finally, there should be some moral blameworthiness on the part of
the tortfeasor, and ideally this blameworthiness should be more or less
commensurate with the harm caused. Negligence liability requires
some violation of a duty to act carefully, but the moral shortcoming
associated with violating that duty can range from minimal, as when a
surgeon's knife slips during a delicate operation, to substantial, as
when a wrong leg is amputated because routine checks were not
1. The last two events were, however, predictable in an actuarial sense, and maybe the prob-
lem at Three Mile Island was actuarially predictable as well. See generally CHARLES PERROW,
NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984).
2. The discussion below applies only to unintentional harms of the kind that give rise to suits
for negligence or strict liability. Recovery for intentional torts and dignitary harms is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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made. The perceived fairness of compensation depends not just on
the degree of harm done but also on assessments of the culpability of
the negligent behavior. In the extreme case, the line between the civil
and criminal is breached, and punitive damages may be awarded or a
matter may be converted from tort to crime.
There is perhaps no type of injury that is perfectly suited to tort
compensation if suitability requires that these four conditions be al-
ways met, but some kinds of cases fit the model of when tort liability is
most appropriate better than others. An example that comes close is
the minimal to moderately serious auto accident. Because almost
every driver is insured, there is a fund to compensate those who are
injured. Transaction costs are frequently low because simple rules-of-
thumb can be applied to determine liability when the stakes are not
very high.3 Although the ubiquity of insurance may dampen the de-
terrent effects of tort liability, the effects of accident involvement on
insurance rates provide another route for deterrence to affect decision
making. Finally, those responsible for accidents typically have failed
in well-known duties and often their way of failing-speeding, run-
ning a stop sign, talking on a cell phone, etc.-can be known precisely.
Insurance, however, interferes with the morality goal by transforming
the experience of being held liable from a responsibility for a moral
failing to an unavoidable cost of choosing to drive.
This analysis applies only to run of the mill cases. Other cases pose
complicated legal and factual problems, and transaction costs can be
enormous. Indeed, study after study, beginning with the work of Al-
fred Conard 4 in the 1960s, has shown that victims in the least serious
auto accidents tend to be overcompensated while those in the most
serious accidents are substantially undercompensated after lawyers'
fees and other transaction costs have been paid.5 Even in the less seri-
ous cases, greater efficiency may often be achieved by avoiding the
tort system entirely. Hence the rise of no-fault auto insurance.
6
3. See generally H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (2d rev. ed. 1980).
4. See generally ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS:
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964).
5. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970); see also Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Sys-
tems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOWA L. REV. 833
(1984) (examining various types of auto insurance regimes and their relative economic
incentives).
6. See generally ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965) (laying out
the concepts of no-fault insurance that came to be known as the "Keeton-O'Connell Plan"). See
also Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance
359
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Another area where the goals of tort law seem relatively close to
realization is one where tort liability has been abandoned: worker's
compensation. Requiring companies to either have insurance or show
a capacity to self-insure guarantees that there will be a fund to com-
pensate injuries. By making compensation almost automatic in most
circumstances, transaction costs are minimized. Deterrence exists
through experientially rated or self-insurance systems that become
more expensive as a company's injury costs rise. Prevention is en-
hanced because data is collected on all injuries that occur in a plant,
location, or process, making it easier to spot situations where the or-
ganization of work contributes to high accident rates. Unlike the tort
system which at least in theory encourages care on the part of poten-
tial victims because contributory negligence thwarts recovery, com-
pensation schemes do little to reduce injuries through their effects on
victim behavior. Moreover, the moral element is almost completely
lacking. Organizing work in ways that increase rather than decrease
injury risk is not wrong in the sense of violating a duty of care that a
company owes its workers; it is just bad business, and then only in
situations where the cost of promoting workplace safety is less than
the cost of compensating for the "excess" accidents that occur. Never-
theless, worker's compensation is generally regarded as far superior to
the system of negligence liability it replaced, where transaction costs
were high; defenses like assumption of the risk and contributory negli-
gence meant that many injured workers went uncompensated, and
businesses had little idea how much they would have to pay out in a
year for workplace injuries.7 For these and other reasons, the legal
treatment of workplace injuries before worker's compensation
schemes did not come close to meeting our posited requisites for tort
liability. Thus, it is not surprising that the movement towards
worker's compensation schemes triumphed in all states.
III. Low PROBABILITY/HIGH CONSEQUENCE INCIDENTS
The point of this excursion into the world of ordinary torts is that if
tort compensation schemes are far from perfect in accident situations
that gave rise to and in some measure still best fit the desiderata for
tort liability, the fit is likely to be much poorer when harm is caused
by low probability/high consequence events that, if we were starting
for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976) (arguing in favor of a no-fault liability
system as a means of reducing systemic tort costs).
7. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Acci-
dents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 69-72 (1967) (describing the emergence of the modern worker's
compensation system).
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from scratch, we might never consider compensating through tort lia-
bility. In these kinds of cases, it is only by chance that any of the
requisites for tort liability will be met. Damages from high conse-
quence events may be so high that no one, apart from government,
will have pockets deep enough to compensate all victims. Transaction
costs are likely to be huge, given the difficulties of assembling plain-
tiffs and defendants for litigation, the vast amount of material that
may have to be discovered and reviewed to determine responsibility,
and stakes so high that parties will have strong incentives to invest
heavily in every phase of the action. The Exxon Valdez litigation, for
example, threatened to be another Jarndyce v. Jarndyce8 before it was
resolved, more than fifteen years after the accident. 9 The cost of Ex-
xon's defense in this case is thought to be in the hundreds of millions
of dollars,10 but with a punitive damage award of five billion dollars to
contest, even these expenditures made good business sense. In the
lower courts, the damages were cut in half, and the Supreme Court
reduced them by another eighty percent."
Deterrence effects in these cases are likely to be minimal because
the ways in which low probability events cause their harms are diffi-
cult to anticipate, and a particular low probability/high consequence
harm might not be expected to occur in the same way again, if it oc-
curs at all. Indeed, as is arguably the case with the nuclear generation
of electricity after Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, what may be de-
terred is not careless or reckless behavior but rather an activity that
has considerable value and only a very low chance of causing great
harm. Finally, people need financial help following serious harm
whether or not there is sufficient evidence of negligence to justify it.
8. This famously interminable but fictional legal dispute over an inheritance forms the back-
drop for one of Charles Dickens's greatest novels. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 16
(Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin Books 2003) (1853) ("This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of
time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means.").
9. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
10. The cost includes commissioning numerous studies to challenge the institution of punitive
damages as well as the capacity of juries to fairly award them. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al.,
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J.
2071 (1998) (assessing sources of arbitrariness and unpredictability in punitive damage awards);
see also Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a
Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 904-21 (1998) (reporting empirical research suggesting
judges are less prone to certain cognitive biases than juries). But see Richard Lempert, Juries,
Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 867 (1999) (questioning the quality and the interpretation of the empirical
evidence used in Hastie & Viscusi's study).
11. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (holding that under the Clean Water Act the
maximum amount of punitive damages awarded could not exceed the jury's compensatory dam-
ages award of $507.5 million, ensuring a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages).
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As for the moral dimension, in situations like the 9/11 assault on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, even when negligence argua-
bly exacerbated harm, the damages for which recovery is sought may
seem far out of proportion to the moral failings of actors, like the
airlines and their screeners, whom plaintiffs seek to hold accountable.
As deplorable and devastating as the 9/11 assault was, it is hard to
fault the inspectors at the various airports who let the men who would
later hijack the planes board with box cutters in their carry-on lug-
gage. Small blades like these items were not forbidden, and few
would have anticipated they would be used to take over planes.
Moreover, while an inspector should have perhaps become suspicious
when five different people had the same sharp object in their lug-
gage-if the sharp object seemed the same in different x-ray views-it
is likely that different hijackers had their belongings viewed by differ-
ent inspectors. It is even harder to fault the airplane flight crews for
acceding to the hijackers' demands because until these incidents no
airplane hijackers had tried to crash planes they took over. In acced-
ing to the hijackers' demands (until it became too late), the planes'
crews were following an established protocol to minimize the loss of
life.
In the Exxon Valdez case the captain's negligence in drinking while
in command of a ship was clear, and Exxon's negligence in allowing
that captain to command a tanker knowing his history may also seem
blameworthy. Nevertheless, obliging Exxon to pay billions of dollars
in compensatory and punitive damages is arguably out of all propor-
tion to the company's, if not the captain's, moral failings, regardless of
whether it is proportionate to the harm caused.
In addition, the United States government was deeply involved-in
the sense of having considerable causal responsibility-in three of the
incidents discussed here. In New Orleans, decisions by the Army
Corps of Engineers were a major contributing factor to the collapse of
the levees, and the federal government added substantially to the
harms people suffered by the many shortcomings in its evacuation and
recovery activities. The 9/11 hijackings might have been avoided had
the FBI acted on urgent messages from its field agents about possible
plots, and the government regulated what items were and were not
permitted on planes. It also, no doubt, had the lead role in establish-
ing the protocols plane crews should follow during an attempted hi-
jacking. Three Mile Island involved a tightly regulated industry that
looked to the government to set safety standards, and government
regulators had the responsibility to ensure that its standards were fol-
lowed. Even the Exxon Valdez incident involved a regulated activity,
362 [Vol. 58:357
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although it does not seem that a failure of the regulatory process in
standard setting or surveillance was responsible for what happened.
Many of the governmental activities that contributed to these disas-
ters were not, however, the kind that give rise to governmental liabil-
ity as provided for in the Federal Torts Claims Act 12 and other
statutes. 13 Rather, they all involved at least some activities that were
uniquely governmental or highly discretionary, for which the govern-
ment has not consented to be sued. Thus, even though the govern-
ment has the deep pockets needed to compensate people for major
disasters, and even though in some of the four instances we are exam-
ining the government, through its agents, seems morally at fault in
much the same way ordinary corporate tortfeasors are at fault, many
of those harmed by governmental decisions and actions have limited
or no remedies available through the tort system.
Because I lack the imagination or do not dare to envision the next
catastrophic events to harm the nation, the remainder of this Article
will continue the focus on Three Mile Island, the Exxon Valdez oil
spill, the 9/11 attacks, and Hurricane Katrina as exemplars of how the
tort system does and does not work when faced with low probability/
high consequence events. The conclusion will discuss lessons that may
be drawn from these examples.
A. Three Mile Island
Responses to the four low probability/high impact disasters that we
are using as examples have been quite different from the standpoint of
tort compensation. In the case of the radiation leak from Three Mile
Island, negligence appeared clear, but the prospect of harm from the
leaked radiation was unclear. The harm, most likely in the form of an
increased incidence of cancer, would take years to manifest itself.
Given a manifestation lag of perhaps decades and the many possible
causes of cancer, most plaintiffs would find it impossible to show by
the preponderance of the evidence that the radiation exposure caused
their disease. Negligence, however, was irrelevant to compensation
from this leak. Under the Price-Anderson Act, 14 first passed in 1957
and renewed several times since, recovery for nuclear accidents is on a
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
13. See generally The Price-Anderson Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000) (laying out
the indemnification and liability limitations for nuclear reactor facilities); see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 702(c) (2000) (a flood control statute which provides that, with certain exceptions, "[n]o liabil-
ity of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or
flood waters at any place").
14. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000)).
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no-fault basis, with a cap on total liability and no possibility of puni-
tive damages.
Following the Three Mile Island radiation leak, about seventy mil-
lion dollars was paid out, a portion as voluntary aid or settlements and
some in response to law suits. These payments included the establish-
ment of a five-million-dollar fund to be used for public health mea-
sures in the area most exposed to leaked radiation rather than for
individual injuries15 and a twenty-million-dollar fund to aid businesses
within the twenty-five-mile region surrounding the power plant.
These payments came entirely from the utility's primary insurer rather
than from the special fund that Price-Anderson contemplates. 16
Price-Anderson establishes an interesting scheme to fund recov-
eries-one that might potentially be adapted to other low probability/
high consequence risks. To oversimplify a bit,17 it requires the opera-
tors of all nuclear reactors to self-insure up to the amount of insurance
available for purchase on the private market, currently $300 million.
Then it requires all companies with nuclear reactors to collectively in-
sure against damage from accidents at any plant that exceeds the $300
million covered by a plant's primary insurance. Currently, the contri-
bution per reactor is close to ninety-six million dollars, and the total
fund created by this scheme is about ten billion dollars. Comple-
menting these funding arrangements are procedural rules that (1) re-
quire that suits for damages due to covered activities be heard in
federal court; (2) provide that if causality is proved there is no need to
prove faulty behavior by the company whose activities led to the
harm; (3) bar punitive damages; and (4) limit the amount of corporate
liability to the mandated primary insurance coverage and the collec-
tive fund contribution. Most interesting is that, although I have spo-
ken of the collective fund contribution assessed against each reactor
as an insurance payment, for in its risk spreading it is very much like
one, unlike ordinary insurance this payment need not be made unless
an accident occurs and the costs of accident-associated compensation
exceed a company's primary insurance coverage, something that has
15. The most likely physical injuries of any severity would be radiation-induced DNA damage
that many years later would manifest itself as a cancer. These injuries were unknown at the time
compensation was paid, and tracing specific later emerging cancers in the population exposed to
the Three Mile Island radiation leak to the leak, as opposed to other cancer causes, would almost
certainly be impossible.
16. AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY, PRICE-ANDERSON Acr: BACKGROUND FOR POSITION
STATEMENT 543 (2005).
17. The amounts in the discussion that follows apply only to the largest category of nuclear
reactors. Certain lower-powered nuclear reactors must self-insure and contribute to the general
Price-Anderson fund at lower levels as must certain other kinds of businesses, such as transport-
ers and waste disposal facilities that are also covered by and protected under the Act.
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not yet happened. Thus, while ninety-six million dollars sounds like a
lot of money for liability protection, to date no company has had to
pay to the common fund because no accident requiring payment from
the fund has occurred.
In one way this is a clever solution to the problem of the low
probability/high consequence event. Because of the great uncertainty
surrounding both the likelihood and costs of a serious nuclear acci-
dent, it is difficult, if not impossible, to actuarially evaluate expected
insurance payouts; hence, setting appropriate insurance rates is more
guesswork than science, and beyond a certain level, which today ap-
pears to be about $300 million, insurers are unwilling to risk the possi-
bility of catastrophic liability. But the solution is also fraught with
problems. The one most frequently pointed out and which most trou-
bles consumer protection groups is that liability is capped far below
the damages that a more serious reactor catastrophe, like that at
Chernobyl, might inflict.18 Thus, in the face of a truly catastrophic
accident, the compensation goal of tort law would not be met unless
Congress chose to allocate additional funds to pay for the injuries of
those harmed.
In the case of small harms, like those associated with Three Mile
Island, Price-Anderson seems to have worked well. It reduced trans-
action costs while quickly paying documented damages. The situation
might be different should catastrophic losses occur. While no-fault
compensation should, in theory, limit litigation and reduce transaction
costs, contests among those harmed to get larger pieces of an insuffi-
cient pie may lead to considerable litigation and related expenses.
The possible compensation shortcomings of the Price-Anderson so-
lution are closely related to another oft-cited fault, one which might
be exacerbated rather than cured if Congress can be expected to pay
for nuclear accident costs beyond what the Price-Anderson fund can
cover. Because the fund and hence the financial obligations placed on
the nuclear industry fall far short of what full compensation for acci-
dents might require, the accident deterrence function of tort law is
undermined. If a reactor owner knows that even if a loss of contain-
ment causes tens of billions of dollars in damages, his liability will be
capped at under $100 million, he will, in theory, have insufficient in-
18. High end estimates of the damages caused by Chernobyl range from $200 billion to $500
billion. PUBLIC CITIZEN, PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: THE BILLION DOLLAR BAILOUT FOR Nu-
CLEAR POWER MISHAPS 2 (2004). Even if these damage estimates are far too high, a similar
accident in the United States might well reach this level because of the higher property values
that exist here, medical care costs that are far greater than in Russia, and the high monetary
value we place on negligently taken human lives or negligently caused cancers and serious
injuries.
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centive to take care. If the total damages are under ten billion dollars,
an insufficiently careful company may not even suffer a great public
relations loss, for the combined fund will pay all justified claims. We
have in the past year, for example, learned of nuclear power plant
security guards who slept while on duty.19 If the facilities and contrac-
tors employing these guards knew that they faced catastrophic rather
than relatively modest costs should terrorists blow up a reactor, would
they perhaps have better supervised their guards or maybe have paid
their guards more so that they could employ top people? Economic
theory suggests increased caution, and a willingness to pay what it
took to employ quality help would be more likely.
A diminished incentive to take care is likely whenever the costs of
eventuating risks are socialized, as they are in all insurance. But in-
surance schemes have ways of restoring a portion of this incentive
through experiential rating. Indeed, the prospect of increased insur-
ance costs may be more salient than the likely harm of accidents in
causing drivers to take care. Insurance premiums also provide infor-
mation to insureds about their evaluated risks. Yet even though the
apparent risk of a nuclear reactor disaster increased dramatically after
9/11, feedback to those operating nuclear reactors through insurance
premium adjustments could not have been great, if it existed at all.20
Finally, the moral dimension to tort liability is largely gutted by the
provisions of Price-Anderson. Fault plays no part in accident compen-
sation decisions, and punitive damages are barred. 21 This means that
no matter how far short of due care a reactor operator falls, no price
will be paid for it. An operator focused on the near-term bottom line
might decide that it would rather pay a contractor less money for se-
curity services and risk having inadequately trained, sleepy guards
than pay more money for well-trained, alert guards. The economic
calculus is simple. Alert guards command higher salaries than sleepy
ones. If sleeping guards allow terrorists to successfully attack a reac-
tor, the monetary price is no greater than it would be in the case of an
unavoidable accident.
19. Steven Mufson, Video of Sleeping Guards Shakes Nuclear Industry, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,
2008, at A01; H. Josef Hebert, NRC Accused of Ignoring Sleeping Guards, USA TODAY, Sept.
28, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews/nation/2007-09-28-nrc-guards-N.htm.
20. I have been unable to find out if premiums for the compulsory primary insurance that
Price-Anderson requires increased dramatically after 9/11, but the amount of primary coverage
available increased rather than dropped which, if it conveyed any message, would suggest that
risks became less of a concern. The implausibility of this conclusion brings into question how
private and immune from political influence this so-called private market is.
21. 42 U.S.C § 2210(s) (2000).
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Contributory negligence is also removed from the recovery scheme,
in theory reducing victims' incentives to avoid exacerbating the harms
done them. An individual who was seriously contaminated because
he intentionally returned to a radioactive zone to retrieve personal
property would be entitled to the same award as a person similarly
injured because she could not escape the initial radiation release. Fi-
nally, good plant operators are not rewarded. Nuclear reactor compa-
nies that invested heavily in plant security and safety will be on the
hook for the same amount as the plant operators who cut the corners
that led to disaster.
Price-Anderson is the most elaborate scheme we have for dealing
with low probability/high consequence, and, hence, difficult to fore-
see, disasters. It is clearly far from ideal in some respects, but, for all
its deficiencies, it may offer more than some of the other schemes
used to compensate for the disasters we are considering. Or perhaps
it only seems better given the applications we have seen so far. Fortu-
nately, the United States has never had to confront a nuclear disaster
on the scale of Chernobyl, so we do not know how the Price-Ander-
son solution would look in a situation that triggered its special mecha-
nisms. Nor do we know whether Price-Anderson's liability limits
created disincentives to investments in safety and, thus, contributed to
the catastrophe at Three Mile Island.22
B. Exxon Valdez
The Exxon Valdez case illustrates another way of resolving issues
growing out of low probability/high consequence accidents 23-letting
the legal system take its course. If Exxon Valdez is the model of how
the "litigation as usual" model works, there are at least as many
problems with this solution as there are with the Price-Anderson Act.
Determining liability in Exxon Valdez was not a problem. Although
Exxon denied the kind of reckless behavior that would justify punitive
22. Because nuclear power plants and other reactors are highly regulated, one might argue
that the incentives toward safety that the prospect of tort liability brings are not needed; govern-
ment-imposed behavior will ensure adequate investments in safety. In theory the argument
works, but in practice we see instance after instance where regulatory protection breaks down
either because of a regulator's organizational and individual shortcomings or because political
ideology trumps safety concerns in setting the level of regulation. The subprime mortgage deba-
cle is the most recent example.
23. One can argue that an oil spill from a tanker is not a low probability event as spills occur
with some frequency, but spills with the consequences of the Exxon Valdez oil spill are rare
events and not easily anticipated. (Between 1976 and 1991 there were at least nineteen oil spills
of greater volume than the Exxon Valdez. The economic and ecological consequences of the
Exxon Valdez spill were extraordinarily high because the spill occurred in a valuable fishery and
a pristine natural environment.)
2009]
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damages, it admitted from the outset that the spill and most of the
subsequent damage were due to its negligence and the negligence of
its agent. That agent, the Exxon Valdez's captain, was a known, albeit
presumably recovered, alcoholic who had been drinking heavily the
night of the accident. 24 Indeed, the day after the accident the captain
was fired.
Even with negligence admitted, transaction costs in this case were
huge. The case saw more than 1000 depositions taken over 2500 dep-
osition days, including 200 expert witnesses deposed over 450 days.25
There were more than 7500 filings, 1000 motions, 550 discovery adju-
dications and 370 numbered orders.26 More than sixty law firms had a
role in the punitive damage trial growing out of the incident.27 The
trial involved 155 witnesses, 36 experts, 453 plaintiff exhibits, and 656
defendant exhibits.28 An Alaska state court and the federal district
court engaged in a tug of war over jurisdiction, and the Ninth Circuit
heard aspects of the case on a number of occasions. 29 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari in 2000 before finally hearing the case in
2008.30 It has been estimated, that as of 1999, Exxon had spent $300
million in its defense,31 and only the plaintiffs' lawyers know what
costs have been advanced on their side and how much lawyer time has
been expended. What is known is that the plaintiffs' attorneys were
supposed to receive 22.4% of amounts eventually paid, another sub-
stantial transaction cost.
Delay compounded problems. When in 1994 the punitive damage
jury handed down its verdict, as Brian O'Neill, the plaintiffs' lead
counsel, was hugging his three-year-old son, one of the lawyers for
24. Eleven hours after the accident the Exxon Valdez's captain's blood alcohol was above .06.
It has been estimated that at the time of the accident it was .24. The legal limit is .04. See 33
C.F.R. § 95.020 (2007).
25. William B. Hirsch, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Justice Delayed: Seven Years Later and
No End in Sight (2006), available at http://www.lieffcabraser.com/wbh-exxart.htm.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613-15 (2008).
30. See supra note 29 for the full history.
31. Robert E. Jenkins & Jill W. Kastner, Comment, Running Aground in a Sea of Complex
Litigation: A Case Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
151 (2000). Much of the discussion that follows is based on this detailed and balanced discussion
of the course of this litigation by two law students. It is interesting to contrast this discussion,
and especially its treatment of the rulings of Judge Holland, who tried the federal case, with the
similar portrayal of the case on the plaintiffs' website. See Faegre & Benson LLP, Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill Litigation Update, http://www.faegre.com/showarticle.aspxShow=2881 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2009). There is considerable consistency in the events and the rulings each reports, but
the authors' interpretations of the appropriateness of the Judge's rulings and of Exxon's actions
are in many places strikingly different.
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Exxon leaned over and commented, "He'll be in college before you
get any of that money. '32 The Exxon lawyer's forecast was close to
the mark. Brian O'Neill's son may well have started college before
any of the money finally awarded was apportioned.
Some of Exxon's appeals were clearly well advised and legally justi-
fied, as Exxon succeeded first in having the punitive damage award
cut in half by the Ninth Circuit and then saw it cut another eighty
percent by the United States Supreme Court. But much of the delay
attributable to Exxon's appeals and other tactics appears frivolous or
worse. For example, Exxon appealed the trial judge's decision to al-
low a juror to remain on the jury after she first stated that she wanted
to be relieved, then said that she did not and finally said that she did.33
But the reason the juror first changed her mind and said she would
stay was because, she told the judge, she was the only juror who did
not think punitive damages were justified. 34 Exxon could hardly have
been prejudiced by her remaining seated despite her final desire to be
excused.35 Further delay was attributable to a secret agreement that
Exxon made in settling with some Seattle canneries. 36 The settlement
included a commitment by the canneries to claim a share of any puni-
tive damage award despite their private settlement and to then refund
almost all of what they received to Exxon.37 The details of this settle-
ment were initially hidden from the plaintiffs and the judge.3 8 Com-
pounding this breach of candor and arguably of ethics, Exxon had the
temerity to argue to the jury, presumably as evidence of its good faith,
that it had voluntarily settled with the canneries asking nothing in
return.39
One may wonder why Exxon would seek delay, for their litigation
costs were increased by their many motions and appeals. One sugges-
tion is that the interest Exxon earned from retaining and investing the
five billion dollars far exceeded the costs of delay, even given Exxon's
obligation to pay statutory interest from the date the judgment was
entered.40 So, taking advantage of all possible avenues for delay and
appeal paid off financially for Exxon, regardless of the likelihood that
32. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 31, at 192.
33. Id. at 195-200.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 200-04.
37. Id.
38. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 31, at 200-01.
39. Id. at 204.
40. See generally Opinion, Slow Justice, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 28, 2008, at B4 (stat-
ing that Exxon earned between twelve and twenty-six percent interest on the money but will
only have to pay 5.9% on the judgment).
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an action would succeed.41 But, for the plaintiffs, delay meant that
they and their law firms were for years unable to benefit from the jury
award, even though it was ultimately partially upheld on appeal.
Moreover, the appeals and delay imposed substantial costs on the ju-
dicial system through its need to deal with Exxon's many motions and
claims of error.
Turning from transaction costs and delay to issues of compensation,
the situation gets even fuzzier. Regardless of the outcome of the puni-
tive damages suit, Exxon has paid out substantial sums as a result of
the accident. Exxon's clean-up costs appear to have been in excess of
three billion dollars; the State of Alaska received more than $900 mil-
lion as general compensation for environmental damage, an Exxon-
created settlement fund paid out more than $300 million dollars, and a
no-fault compensation fund primarily aimed at compensation for
pipeline leaks paid out its single event maximum of $100 million. 42
Exxon's net outlay, while not as much as these figures indicate be-
cause of insurance coverage and the fact that many of its costs were
tax deductable, was still substantial. But even these hefty payouts
may not have fully compensated for the harm done. Moreover, many
of those harmed received little or no compensation. Conversely, if the
41. Although losing litigants are often obligated to escrow enough money to cover a judgment
pending an appeal and so do not benefit from their ability to invest the judgment money, the
trial judge was confident that Exxon could pay off the judgment (a confidence Exxon fortified
with a guarantee arrangement with Bank of America) and so did not impose any escrow require-
ment. Apparently, the judge did not consider the incentives for delay that allowing Exxon to
retain and invest the amount awarded would provide. It should be noted that Exxon's all out
assault on the verdict led it to spend money even when returns from delay could not be antici-
pated. Thus, it commissioned numerous social science studies by leading scholars to argue
against the institution of punitive damages in general and a jury's capacity to fairly award them
in particular. See supra note 10; Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror Judg-
ments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiffs Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive Damage
Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445 (1999); Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R.
Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998); David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating
About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel
Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001); W. Kip
Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001);
W. Kip Viscusi, Why There is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381 (1998). In
addition, the Exxon legal team aggressively sought to overcome guarantees of confidentiality
that a sociologist doing research on the Exxon Valdez disaster provided his subjects in an NSF-
funded survey in Alaska. J. Steven Picou, Compelled Disclosure of Scholarly Research: Some
Comments on "High Stakes Litigation," LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1996, at 149, 151-53.
42. In addition, the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, a seven-member consortium of oil
companies, including Exxon, that runs the trans-Alaska pipeline, paid out about ninety-eight
million dollars as compensation for deficiencies in its clean-up activities. In re Exxon Valdez,
No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), 1993 WL 64910, at *1-2 (D. Alaska Dec. 8, 1993).
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initial punitive damages award had been sustained, some plaintiffs
might have received a financial windfall.43
Despite the amount Exxon invested in clean-up, considerable evi-
dence of the oil spill remains. 44 It is doubtful that any clean-up effort,
however much it cost, could have removed all traces of the spill.
Moreover, the court's decision on the relevant law ensured that many
harms would not be compensated. The federal court overruled state
court rulings and decided that the oil spill was a maritime tort and that
the cases of almost all plaintiffs were governed by federal maritime
law.45 In particular, this meant that the rule of Robins Dry Dock ap-
plied.46 Robins Dry Dock limits tort recoveries to economic losses,
but, with the exception of fishermen, allows recovery only to those
who have suffered physical harm to themselves or their property.
Moreover, in oil spill cases courts usually rule that to be compensable
harms must be directly, rather than indirectly, attributable to the
spill.47 Non-economic harms are thus not compensable, although
there is evidence that many Alaskan families suffered stress due to
loss of employment as a consequence of the spill. Similarly, Native
Alaskans' claims of cultural harm were ruled non-compensable. In
addition, not all directly related, demonstrable economic harms are
compensable under Robins Dry Dock.48
Thus, while the Alaskan District Court allowed fisherman to re-
cover for their lost income, those merchants who purchase the fish
from the boats and process and resell them were found to have suf-
fered no compensable harms because they are not fisherman and suf-
fered no direct physical harm from the spill.49 Likewise, a California
trial court dismissed the claims of a motorist group that complained
that the price of gas in California went up twenty cents a gallon as a
result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. This latter dismissal may appear
intuitively right, but if the claim of the motorist group is correct, a
huge uncompensated cost was imposed on all California drivers, and
some of it may have found its way into Exxon's pocket because of the
higher price it could charge for gas. The settlement with Alaska was
43. Carrie Tait, Spillionaires, FIN. POST, Aug. 30, 2008, available at http://www.financialpost.
com/most-popular/story.html?id=756805.
44. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, $92 Million More Sought for Exxon Valdez Cleanup, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A14 (discussing government invocation of settlement clause requiring
additional funds from Exxon for "stubborn patches of oil" that still remain in Prince William
Sound).
45. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2626 (2008).
46. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
47. Id. at 308-09.
48. Id. at 309.
49. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2626, 2637.
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intended to compensate all Alaskan residents for economic and non-
economic harms to their environment, but no provision was made to
allocate portions of this settlement to those who could show specific
personal harms. The punitive damage award was, in theory, for pur-
poses other than compensation; in practice, it may allow people to
receive payments for otherwise uncompensable harms personally
suffered. 50
If the compensation paid by Exxon does not equal the losses it
caused even after clean-up efforts then, in theory, the deterrent goals
of tort law will not be met. Here, however, reality should trump the-
ory. Surely, Exxon Valdez provides an object lesson in how expensive
carelessness in vetting crew members and running tankers can be.
Whether or not Exxon's payout equaled the cost of harm done, it is
hard to believe that it has not made Exxon more careful about whom
it employs, the protocols it follows, and its willingness to phase out
single-bottom tankers. Indeed, this probably would have happened
without any tort recovery at all, for the bulk of Exxon's spill-related
costs have come from the money it dedicated to clean-up efforts.
Finally, from a moral point of view, the situation is not clear. Al-
though it is hard to have sympathy for Exxon, particularly given its
"take no prisoners" attitude toward the litigation, its moral failing,
which was to too readily assume a tanker captain had conquered a
drinking problem, does not seem like a multi-billion dollar error.
Moreover, its liability, apart from punitive damages, might have been
the same even if it had no reason to know its captain was a drunkard,
for it is largely derivative of the captain's negligence. As for the latter,
his negligence was in leaving an inexperienced third mate in command
at the wheel when navigating through known perilous waters. It is not
obvious that the captain would have done things differently had he
not been drinking, though perhaps he would have realized that the
paperwork he left the bridge to complete was not a high priority.
Perhaps the Exxon Valdez case should not be a guide, but to the
extent it is, it appears that ordinary tort procedures are a poor way to
compensate for damages caused by low probability/high consequence
events, even when negligence is not an issue.
50. Under the current settlement plan, approximately $383 million will be released and dis-
tributed to the 33,000 commercial fishermen and other plaintiffs. Still to be determined is the
fate of an additional seventy million dollars, as well as $488 million in alleged interest owed,
which is still the subject of litigation. See Wesley Loy & Tom Kizzia, Exxon Valdez Settlement
Checks Could Be Distributed in October, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 27, 2008, at Al.
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C. The 9/11 Attacks
The aftermath of the 9/11 airplane hijackings provides yet another
example of how our system has responded to the harms caused by low
probability/high consequence events. In this case, the main response
to the damage claims of those killed or injured in the plane crashes or
the resulting chaos was the establishment of a compensation fund of
up to ten billion dollars and the appointment of a special master to
handle distributions from the fund. Although tort suits were not
barred and some were eventually brought,51 they played a small role
in recovery by individual plaintiffs.52 Indeed, if most individuals had
not elected to claim through the compensation fund, claimants would
most likely have been severely undercompensated. The same legisla-
tion that provided for the Victims Compensation Fund (VCF) also
capped the liability of the airlines at their insurance coverage limits,
which totaled about six billion dollars.5 3
51. The tort cases against the aviation defendants (airlines, security contractors, etc.) that
arose out of the 9/11 hijackings were consolidated in the courtroom of Judge Alvin Hellerstein, a
Federal District Judge for the Southern District of New York. According to the New York
Times, ninety-five lawsuits on behalf of ninety-six victims were filed, and by the time the case
was set for trial only forty-one cases involving forty-two victims, ten of whom were injured
rather than killed, remained. See Anemona Hartocollis, Little-Noticed 9/11 Lawsuits Will Go to
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007, at Al. District court records indicate a substantial further win-
nowing of these cases. By September 24, the date that was originally set for the trial to begin,
only thirteen plaintiffs remained and by November at least three more plaintiffs had settled.
Judge Hellerstein pushed hard to secure these settlements, including taking the unusual step of
planning to try the damage issues before the liability issues. This was done according to the New
York Times to secure figures that would provide "a road map toward settlement." Id. As of
March 27, 2008, the Southern District website summarizing actions taken in 9/11 related litiga-
tion did not indicate that any of the tort cases brought by individual plaintiffs had reached trial,
and Hadfield notes that as of February 2008 the list of still active cases was down to six. Gillian
K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11
Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & Soc'y REV. 645, 675 (2008).
52. Businesses, which were not included in the plan that compensated most individuals, did
bring tort claims, and there was also litigation over the interpretation of insurance contracts.
53. Stephen Landsman, Chance to Be Heard: Thoughts About Schedules, Caps, and Collat-
eral Source Deductions in the September l1th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
393, 396 (2003). Landsman does not provide the insurance cap figure. This estimate comes from
statements of the VCF Special Master. See Erin G. Holt, The September 11 Victim Compensa-
tion Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 513, 514 (2004). The
airlines' liability limits do not cap the total amount tort claimants could as a group have recov-
ered. For example, they could also have sued other defendants for their losses. However, fed-
eral government agencies, whose failings were regarded by many victims as in part responsible
for the losses they suffered, most likely would have been protected by sovereign immunity, and
suits against other defendants would have been hampered, as they were for those who chose to
sue, by the Bush administration's claims of executive and state secret privilege to prevent the
disclosure of information that some plaintiffs thought important to their lawsuits. Walter
Gilberti, Bush Administration Moves to Stifle Discovery in 9/11 Lawsuits, Aug. 2, 2002, www.
wsws.org/articles/2002/aug2002/bush-a02.shtml.
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Several factors seem to have come together to create the VCF.
First, there is the nature of the event. It was seen not just as a tragedy
for the people killed or injured but also as an attack on the nation as a
whole. A national response which treated the victims as though they
had died or been injured while acting for the nation seemed appropri-
ate to many people. Perhaps even more important to Congress was
the threat that large scale litigation posed to the nation's already
troubled airline industry and the air industry's lobbying for financial
aid and protection from liability. Thus, the legislation that established
the compensation fund provided, in other sections, up to fifteen bil-
lion dollars in cash and loan guarantees for costs the airlines incurred
as a result of 9/11. 54 Third, the costs of compensating individual vic-
tims, while large, were manageable. Although ten billion dollars is
not a drop in the bucket, it doesn't bust the budget either and, as it
turned out, while compensable damages were assessed at this aggre-
gate statutory limit, collateral recovery rules meant the government
did not pay thirty percent of the losses found to have occurred. In
addition it has been suggested that Congress simply did not want the
9/11 cases to be handled through the tort system, although it did not
completely foreclose this possibility.55
Applying to the fund required a person to give up the right to sue
any entity for negligence in connection with the 9/11 events. It also
meant putting the amount of one's recovery in the hands of the Spe-
cial Master, Kenneth Feinberg, who did not apply the usual tort rules
for calculating losses. 56 In addition, collateral compensation from all
sources except charities was deducted from the amounts awarded vic-
tims. These accounted for about thirty percent of the calculated
losses, which equaled the ten billion dollar recovery limit the Congress
had set.
By most measures, the use of the special fund to compensate indi-
viduals harmed by the 9/11 hijackings and subsequent crashes worked
well. Ultimately, ninety-seven percent of those people with potential
54. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-
42, Title IV, 115 Stat. 230 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 401 (2000)). For a good overview of what the
act contains, see Joan Bernott Maginnis, The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund: Overview and
Comment, FEDERALIST Soc'y L. & PUB. POL'Y STUD. (2005), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20070326 VictimFund.pdf.
55. See Hadfield, supra note 51, at 650.
56. For those killed, non-economic damages were with rare exceptions set at $250,000 plus
$100,000 for a spouse and each dependent. Id. Awards for those deceased ranged from a mini-
mum of $250,000 to a maximum of $7.1 million with a mean of $2 million and a median of $1.7
million. The spread in awards reflects in large measure the earnings of the person deceased, but
the compensation awarded the heirs of the highest earners is a smaller proportion of their dece-
dents' earnings than the amounts awarded those with lower incomes. Id. at 677 tbl.A5.
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tort claims for the death of a person killed in the attack (2880 claims)
opted to apply to the fund instead of sue, as did 2680 people who
suffered injuries but survived. 57 Awards, which averaged two million
dollars (median $1.7 million) for those killed and $390,000 (median
$110,000) for those injured, were most often substantial, and for many
people compare favorably with what might have been recovered in
tort litigation. The costs of administering the fund were low (eighty-
seven million dollars) relative to the sum disbursed. 58 It is not known
what sums were paid to lawyers by those who sought legal help in
applying to the fund, but at least some representation was pro bono
and, in the rest, costs and fees were surely far less than the costs plus
contingent fee that would have been taken from a plaintiff's recovery
in ordinary tort litigation. Moreover, the injured and representatives
of the deceased who applied to the fund were sure to secure recov-
eries. Recovery would not have been guaranteed in tort litigation.59
Most importantly, the cases were disposed of quickly in comparison to
tort litigation. Within three years of 9/11 all compensation determina-
tions had been made and (presumably) paid out. It has taken six
years for many of the tort cases that grew out of 9/11 to settle, and half
a dozen had yet to be settled as of early 2008.60
Thus, if compensation were the only goal of tort law, one might
conclude that the VCF had worked well. It is, however, impossible to
say whether claimants received more or less than they would have
received through tort litigation, though my guess is that after costs are
taken into account they would have done worse on average and, most
likely, much worse in litigation. Moreover, the VCF had other impor-
tant advantages as a compensation device. In particular, a survey by
Professor Hadfield indicates that the most important motivating fac-
57. Hadfield, supra note 51, at 650-51 (citing KENNETH R. FEINBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSION FUND
OF 2001, at 1 (2005)).
58. A contingent fee at the level contemplated in the Exxon Valdez litigation would, by itself,
have been about twenty-five times as much. The Office of the Special Master did not charge for
its services; the estimated value of these services was $7.2 million. Id. at 650-51.
59. Judge Hellerstein, who heard the tort cases, denied the defendants' motions to dismiss,
ruling that attempts to hijack airplanes were foreseeable and that the various defendants, includ-
ing the airlines and airplane manufacturers, had duties toward the plaintiffs or their decedents
that may have been breached. Opinion and Order Denying Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, In
re September 11 Litigation, No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. 2003), available at http://nysd.us
courts.gov/Sept11Litigation.html. He did not, however, find that there had been breaches of
duty, just that the possibility existed. Id. This threshold finding was all that was necessary to
deny motions by various defendants. Id. Almost all the lawsuits settled, but the amounts of
settlement and the costs involved are not known.
60. Hadfield, supra note 51, at 657 (reporting that six cases remained unsettled as of February
2008).
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tors for those applying to the fund were the speed of the likely recov-
ery, the opportunity to achieve closure and, above all, the opportunity
to avoid the emotional distress of litigating.61
The VCF, like most no-fault schemes, does, however, seem unlikely
to promote the tort goal of deterrence, but one should not make too
much of this. Airlines and their insurers have so much to lose by ter-
rorist hijackings that the marginal effect of tort suits on their future
caretaking is likely to be small, if it exists at all. Moreover, as we have
seen since 9/11, the airlines have had no choice with respect to num-
bers of enhanced security measures because they have been imposed
by regulation. Other entities, like airline manufacturers and owners
and contractors of the World Trade Center, also escaped liability as a
result of most victims turning to the compensation fund. But their
situation is not like that created by Price-Anderson, where potential
tortfeasors know their liability will be limited no matter what their
future negligence. Those who might have been, and in some cases
were, sued in tort must be aware that they were fortuitous benefi-
ciaries of the nature of event and of what was seen by Congress as a
need to bail out the airline industry. Although they were spared lia-
bility this time, they and their insurers can see what their potential
liability might have been, and they have strong incentives to take pre-
cautions commensurate with the liability they might face from similar
but not identical incidents.
The VCF scheme fails most in the moral dimension of the tort re-
covery process and in the incentives litigating parties have to get to
the root causes of tragic events as they seek to prove or refute allega-
tions of faulty behavior. Professor Landsman, drawing on a broad
range of social-psychological research, suggests that limiting the time
available for hearings and making irrelevant many of the responsibil-
ity issues that the victims of 9/11 or their survivors might wish to probe
meant that the VCF was unlikely to fully satisfy victims' needs for
emotional satisfaction or be regarded by them as a completely legiti-
mate way to resolve their claims. 62 Professor Hadfield provides em-
pirical support for Professor Landsman's suggestion with data from a
61. Id. at 665 tbl.3. Unfortunately Professor Hadfield's sample of 9/11 claimants is small and
could not be drawn at random, so one cannot be certain how well her results generalize to the
population of claimants. There is no reason to think her findings about the primary virtues
sample claimants saw in the VCF do not typify the claimant population. Some of the complaints
that sample claimants had about the VCF system may, however, be overrepresented among
sample respondents since those 9/11 claimants who were most active in seeking information and
recovery are likely to be overrepresented in her sample.
62. Landsman, supra note 53, at 409-10.
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survey she conducted with 9/11 victims. 63 Although her numbers can-
not be taken as precisely accurate because of the non-random nature
of her sample and possible biases in it, there is no reason to think her
respondents' attitudes differ substantially from the attitudes of many
of those who received compensation through the VCF. She found
that while victims place the largest portion of the blame for 9/11 on
the terrorists, they also blame other actors for what happened, includ-
ing the INS, the intelligence agencies, the airlines, the airline security
firms, and Presidents Bush and Clinton.64 Moreover, well over half of
Hadfield's respondents felt that the need to forego other civil action in
order to be compensated from the VCF was unfair.65 About three-
quarters of her respondents felt that in the future Congress should not
limit liability for terrorist attacks to the terrorists,66 although, except
for airports and their security companies, this number fell off when
respondents were asked whether the liability of specific potential de-
fendants should be limited. 67 Interestingly, the proportion of respon-
dents rejecting liability limitations was perfectly correlated with the
average blame attributed to different agents, providing strong support
for Landsman's theory about legitimacy. Finally, many respondents
were, at least hypothetically, willing to back up their attitudes with
money. Only 27.7% of Hadfield's respondents said they would be un-
willing to spend part of their recovery to secure a declaratory judg-
ment about the responsibilities of the various agents for the harm they
or their loved ones suffered, and 39.5% said they would be willing to
spend some of their recovery to secure such a determination.68 The
remaining respondent's were unsure what they would do if a declara-
tory judgment were possible on the condition that they pay for it.69
Tort suits, because plaintiffs must show fault, provide a mechanism
for private parties-through discovery, the assembly of witnesses, and
the work of experts-to get at the root causes of tragic events.70
Channeling victims out of the tort system into a system that does not
require proof of fault negates this possibility, and in the context of
9/11 might be seen as limiting our understanding of 9/11 to the results
of official investigations. However, in the context of 9/11, the poten-
63. See generally Hadfield, supra note 51.
64. Id. at 656 tbl.1.
65. Id. at 668 tbl.4.
66. Id. at 669 tbl.6.
67. Id. at 669 tbl.5.
68. Id. at 670 tbl.7.
69. Hadfield, supra note 51, at 670 tbl.7.
70. See Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund: Born from a Unique Confluence of
Events Not Likely to Be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 213 (2003).
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tial of tort litigation to illuminate what happened was, as can be seen
from the tort cases that were filed, limited. Some potential defend-
ants, including perhaps those agencies most likely to have been at
fault, like the federal intelligence agencies, the FAA, and the military,
are protected from suit by sovereign immunity. In addition, the Bush
administration interjected claims of privilege to preclude parties from
discovering what it regarded as sensitive governmental information.
Moreover, much of the information secured by the tort plaintiffs dur-
ing discovery was produced pursuant to protective orders, and final
settlements apparently provided that the settling parties would release
no information about the case. Perhaps for these reasons, no major
revelations about the relative responsibility of various parties have
emerged from the suits that were brought and settled. Accordingly, I
expect that information loss due to channeling cases away from the
tort system was in the case of 9/11 more hypothetical than real.
D. Hurricane Katrina and the Flooding of New Orleans
Regardless of how one balances the virtues of the VCF scheme with
its deficiencies, the combination of concerns and the sense of solidar-
ity with victims that led to the VCF's creation is unlikely to be dupli-
cated when other low probability/high consequence events strike.71
We see evidence for this view in the contrast with responses to Hurri-
cane Katrina, an event with fewer deaths but much higher total losses
and a far larger group of victims. The legal situation after Katrina is
far more muddled than it was after any of the other cases we have
examined, no doubt due to the event's scale. Litigation has included
disputes over insurance contracts as well as federal and state tort cases
encompassing both individual and class actions. Financial and in-kind
compensation for harm, as well as funding for rebuilding, has come
from the federal government, state governments, and insurance com-
panies. New law suits have arisen from efforts to help remedy the
situation, such as cases filed against FEMA for providing temporary
trailer homes with unhealthy levels of formaldehyde vapor. 72 Moreo-
ver, we are still too close in time to the disaster to assess all damages
suffered or for most legal claims to have been resolved. Where aid
and compensation have been provided, their adequacy is often
unclear.
71. Landsman, supra note 53, at 412.
72. See Ralph Blumenthal, Stalled Health Tests Leave Storm Trailers in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2007, at A20; see also Storm Victims Sue Over Trailers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, at A16
(reporting over 500 people filed suit against FEMA trailer manufacturers).
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We can, however, say some things based on what we already know.
First, a lot of the money going to those who were displaced, injured,
rendered jobless, or otherwise harmed by Katrina has taken forms as-
sociated with welfare payments rather than accident compensation.
Moreover, as with most welfare payments, needs have often not been
met entirely and bureaucratic barriers to prompt aid have frustrated
both claimants and those who sought to help. 73 Second, much of the
money recovered to date has been recovered through insurance claims
for property damage and personal injuries. Indeed, much of the litiga-
tion that has to date led to compensation has involved disputed inter-
pretations of insurance contracts-not suits in tort.74 Third, tort
actions of all kinds have been brought against all types of defendants.
These range from large scale class actions against the Army Corps of
Engineers and FEMA to more localized class action suits against oil
companies, cities, and parishes, to single plaintiff actions against indi-
vidual defendants and small businesses.75 Fourth, because of the dif-
ferential applicability of such defenses as "act of God," sovereign
immunity, and the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, there can be considerable inconsistency in who is able to recover
in tort and whom they will be able to recover from, even in situations
where injuries suffered and causes of injury are almost identical.
Thus, the federal judge hearing the litigation growing out of the New
Orleans flooding dismissed one class action involving 350,000 claim-
ants because he found that the levees that were breached due to faulty
construction were part of flood control efforts, meaning recovery was
barred by the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states that "[njo liabil-
73. Pamela Winston et al., Federalism After Hurricane Katrina: How Can Social Programs
Respond to a Major Disaster?, 81 TUL. L. REv. 1219 (2007) (arguing that complex government
programs inhibit disaster relief).
74. One story in the New York Times estimated the insurance payout as of September 2008 at
forty-one billion dollars. See Brian Stelter, Storm's Toll on Insurers Not on Scale of Katrina,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2008, at C8.
75. For a good review of the range of larger scale litigation, see generally John P. Manard et
al., Katrina's Tort Litigation: An Imperfect Storm, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 31 (2006). For
examples of smaller scale lawsuits that look much like ordinary tort actions, see Complaint,
Piazza's Seafood World, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, 2006 WL 3869532 (La. Dist. Ct. 2005)
(No. 626-371) (Suit to recover the cost of perishable product that was spoiled when storage
facilities owned by the City of New Orleans lost power during Katrina. The private entity that
operated the facility on behalf of the city was also named as a defendant.); Complaint at 5,
Mineo ex rel Mineo v. Underwritings Lloyds London, 2008 WL 4724010 (La. Dist. Ct. 2005) (No.
626-291) (Suit filed by the heirs of a man who died at an assisted living facility after Hurricane
Katrina left the facility without power. This plaintiffs claim that the center should have evacu-
ated their father and otherwise provided him a safe environment.) See also Complaint, Ehlinger
v. Metairie Towers Condo. Ass'n, Inc., (La. Dist. Ct. 2005) (No. 626-251) (Plaintiffs claimed that
they were denied access to their condominiums for several weeks following Hurricane Katrina.
Plaintiffs filed suit against the owner and manager seeking injunctive relief.).
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ity of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any
damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place."' 76 But a few
weeks later the same judge held that a class action based on a similar
breach in flood walls around a canal allegedly due to negligent main-
tenance by the United States Corps of Engineers could proceed be-
cause the canal project was related to navigation and not flood
control.77 Fifth, many of the injuries suffered due to the negligence of
the government and others will not be compensable through tort ac-
tions. In some cases, like the injuries due to the levee breach men-
tioned above or the damages inevitably incurred by some during the
course of clean-up efforts, federal law does not permit recovery
against the sovereign. 78 In other cases, the defendants will simply not
have sufficient funds to pay for the damages they allegedly caused.
And in some cases brought against local governments, class action
plaintiffs may in some measure be suing themselves because any re-
covery would come out of funds created by their taxes. There will, of
course, also be situations where negligence cannot be shown. For ex-
ample, in a case brought against Jefferson Parish, the plaintiffs
claimed the parish erred by allowing those employees who manned
pump stations to leave their posts during Katrina, arguably resulting
in the flooding that subsequently occurred. However, the pumping
stations did not have facilities designed to withstand Category 4 and 5
hurricanes, 79 and it is hard to imagine that a jury will find parish offi-
cials negligent for following a pre-existing plan designed to protect the
lives of those manning the pumping station.
If these problems were not enough, the transaction costs in securing
recovery through the tort system are likely to be huge. Numerous
difficult issues of fact and law must be resolved, and, unlike the other
events we have focused on, there is no easy way to bind causes of
action together in a single class action, nor can one imagine providing
a single compensation scheme to which all those injured can apply.
Because the causes of damage in different areas struck by Katrina
were different and because differently caused injuries raise different
issues of fact and law, we see different configurations of plaintiffs al-
igned against different defendants in many different individual and
76. 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2000).
77. See Adam Nossiter, In Court Ruling on Floods, More Pain for New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2008, at A16. This decision was reversed on appeal. Id.
78. See generally Samantha Turino, Cleaning Up Disaster or Making More? A Look at Ave-
nues of Relief for Those Devastated by the Clean-up Efforts of Hurricane Katrina, 18 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 83 (2007) (discussing damages inflicted due to negligence in the planning and subse-
quent carrying out of clean-up activities).
79. Manard et al., supra note 75, at 34.
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class actions. As for the possibility of a no-fault compensation
scheme, even if substantial incentives for such a scheme existed, the
total damages seem too high to make this politically feasible. For ex-
ample, two scholars estimate the Katrina-caused damage at $141 bil-
lion, not counting economic harm attributable to personal injuries,
loss of life, loss of wages, and general environmental damage.80 While
much of this damage is to publicly funded infrastructure, the private
losses to business and individuals remain huge.
So, from a compensation standpoint, neither the tort system nor
welfare-oriented relief, nor a combination of the two seems adequate
for a satisfactory outcome. Considerable harm is likely to remain un-
compensated even when the harm was in large part negligently
caused. Moreover, even when tort cases are resolved in amounts com-
mensurate with the harm suffered, transaction costs will ordinarily
have been high, recovery will only occur after substantial delay and
some tortfeasors, perhaps themselves impoverished by the flood, will
be unable to pay judgments against them. Other harm, such as much
of the damage that Katrina did in Mississippi, may have -occurred
through no one's fault. Large numbers of tort actions are ongoing,
and there is no telling when most will be settled or resolved. Consid-
erable compensation has been provided relatively quickly to a subset
of insured claimants, but even those who had insurance are often be-
ing compensated for less than their entire loss, and there has been
extensive litigation over definitions of included and excluded causes of
harm.
From a standpoint of the moral considerations that underlie tort
law, the situation is even less satisfactory, if that is possible. On the
one hand, the storm was so severe and its consequences so unex-
pected, whether or not they should have been, that nature, more than
man, seems responsible for the harms done. This certainly seems true
of situations like the Jefferson Parish case where pump-house workers
were told to seek shelter elsewhere because of the danger to their
lives. It is likely to be true in many other situations as well where
people may have been less than completely careful, but they were try-
ing to cope as best they could with unprecedented stresses and chal-
lenges. On the other hand, without clear and severe failures of duty,
the worst of the damage in New Orleans would almost certainly have
been avoided. However, the organization whose failures did the most
harm, the Army Corps of Engineers, may, because of sovereign immu-
80. MARK L. BURTON & MICHAEL J. HICKS, HURRICANE KATRINA: PRELIMINARY ESTI-
MATES OF COMMERCIAL AND PUBLIC SECTOR DAMAGES 1 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.
marshall.edu/cber/research/katrina/Katrina-Estimates.pdf.
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nity, the Flood Control Act of 1928, and exceptions to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, end up having no adjudicated responsibility at all.
Moreover, if the Corps is held responsible, it will not be the Corps
that pays but the country as a whole, thus weakening the connection
between the organization at fault and those who pay the costs of the
faulty behavior.
There also seems to be little to gain in the way of deterrence by
proceedings in tort. To the extent the government is held responsible
and must pay for damages attributable to the negligence of its agents,
no one whose decisions and actions caused the harm will be paying
out of his or her own pocket. Neither the Corps nor the government,
whose leaders turn over rapidly, is likely to draw from an obligation to
pay damages a lasting lesson that they would not otherwise have
learned. Rather, incentives for greater future care will arise out of
professional pride and the realization of the harm that less than care-
ful work and inadequate margins of safety can cause. There is also
likely to be less reluctance in agencies to take seriously the possibility
of worst cases, though how long this lasts remains to be seen. The one
group whose behavior has been affected by the Katrina payouts is in-
surance companies. They are taking more care in what property they
insure, the rates they charge, and the clarity with which they define
exclusions. This is perhaps for the best, but it is hardly a triumph for
the post-Katrina legal process.
IV. AN ASSESSMENT
Where does this review of the different ways in which our legal sys-
tem has responded to the harms caused by low probability/high conse-
quence events leave us? In a word: discouraged. No response has
been entirely adequate. The one which seems to have worked best,
the 9/11 Victim's Compensation Fund, benefited from a set of special
conditions, including a relatively small group of easily identifiable vic-
tims, that may never arise again. Arguably, the compensation scheme
for the Three Mile Island leak worked just as well, but the scale of
harm there meant that the Price-Anderson mechanism was never re-
ally tested. Significantly, both the VCF and Price-Anderson seem to
have arisen not from a desire to compensate accident victims but from
the lobbying of, and a desire to protect, an industry. No-fault victim
compensation appears to be the price paid to get this protection.81
81. The original bill to aid the airline industry after 9/11 did not include provisions for com-
pensating those injured. According to news reports, this was the price that the Democrats in
Congress insisted on to get their support for airline protection. It does not appear, however, that
there was much resistance when proposals to include a victim compensation fund in the bill were
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Moreover, both the VCF and Price-Anderson place caps on the total
amount victims can collect, regardless of the harm done. While the
9/11 caps allowed for what seem to have been generous awards, the
constraint of the cap held at least some awards, particularly those for
very high earners, below what tort standards called for, and considera-
ble consequential damages, such as lost business, lost wages, and prop-
erty damage, were not covered by the VCF.82 The cap incorporated
into Price-Anderson is, coincidentally, about the same today as the
VCF cap, but the damages that might emerge from a serious nuclear
plant meltdown could be an order of magnitude larger than the dam-
ages that occurred on 9/11.83
The two situations in which the tort system remained the primary
mechanism for compensating injured individuals present an even less
pretty picture. The Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation lasted a decade
and a half, vast sums were spent in the litigation effort by both parties,
and the plaintiffs who recovered punitive damages in the tort suits
growing out of the accident had to wait more than thirteen years after
their initial award before being granted a small fraction of what the
jury originally awarded. Allowing tort recovery may have worked in
one respect in that the threat of a trial perhaps induced Exxon to set-
tle claims from the state of Alaska for about one billion dollars, but
this money is not being channeled to victims to compensate for harms
personally suffered. The bulk of the money Exxon dispensed as a re-
sult of its oil spill, more than three billion dollars, went not to victim
compensation but to environmental clean-up. Even this sum has not
reversed the spill's environmental impact, and it is possible no sum
could. Moreover, Exxon's willingness to spend money on clean-up ac-
tivities appears due more to regulatory law and political forces than to
the threat of tort litigation.
The situation following Hurricane Katrina, especially in New Orle-
ans, seems even worse. There the tangled mass of litigation threatens
to rival the mess the flood waters left behind. Courts are swamped
with suits in both torts and contract. In many cases, blame is hard to
assess, and the most clearly blameworthy actors may be immune from
liability. No one knows when or how this mass of litigation will be
made. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Fund For Victim's Families Already Proves
Sore Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001 at Al, cited in Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design
and Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 694 (2003).
82. The exception is the airline industry, which received considerable assistance to enable the
industry to weather the storm of 9/11 and get back on its feet.
83. Congress could add funds to compensate victims of a nuclear-related accident beyond the
Price-Anderson limit, but even though this possibility is provided for in the Act, there is no
guarantee it would happen, much less happen in adequate amounts.
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resolved. When we finally are at a stage where we can look back on
these lawsuits, we are certain to see considerable uncompensated
harm along with tremendous transaction costs.
V. CAN REFORMS HELP?
Given this situation, we can ask whether there are any reforms that
we might make in anticipation of another low probability/high conse-
quence event that might help. Perhaps there are, but none will be
easy to make, including those that require only minor changes to the
existing system. A place to start thinking about improvements is by
noting that, if the four events I focus on in this Article are what we
mean by low probability/high consequence events, not all such events
are in fact of low probability. For a number of years before Katrina,
scientists were confident that it was only a matter of time, and perhaps
not that much time, before New Orleans experienced a storm of such
fury that much of the town would be flooded.8 4 What they did not
expect was that the flooding would be due to the failure of storm walls
and levees rather than to their overtopping by the quantity of rain.
Similarly, ships occasionally run aground, even when their captains
are not drunk. Tanker oil spills, including some that did considerable
ecological damage, had occurred from time to time before the Exxon
Valdez struck its reef. What made the Exxon Valdez spill special was
the amount of oil that escaped, the pristine place where the spill oc-
curred, and the scale of the fishery that was disrupted. Even nuclear
accidents can be seen as inevitable, for machinery degrades and
human error can never be entirely eliminated. 85 In short, of the inci-
dents examined in this article, only 9/11 can be regarded as completely
surprising. No prior model of nature or of human nature would have
predicted that terrorists would hijack four airplanes and crash two of
them into skyscrapers and one into the Pentagon.
Recognizing this, one might say that from the standpoint of risk an-
ticipation an event like Katrina or the Exxon Valdez oil spill does not
differ greatly from an ordinary accident, such as a pedestrian being
struck by a drunk driver. Like Katrina, such incidents are inevitable,
and, like Katrina, there is a very low probability of such an incident
happening at a specific time and place in a specific way to a specific
person. Seen in this light, most serious accidents are low probability/
high (local) consequence events. Two differences, however, make all
84. See John Travis, Scientists' Fears Come True as Hurricane Floods New Orleans, 309 Sci.
1656 (2005).
85. See generally PERROW, supra note 1.
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the difference. The number of accidents caused by driving and the
average harm they produce are actuarially predictable, and specific
accidents pose what are usually easily manageable fact-finding chal-
lenges. These features make possible the efficient development of
third party insurance schemes and legal and organizational routines
that allow the tort system to function tolerably well. But even if a
category five hurricane or a nuclear leak is, over time, inevitable,
events of these sorts are so rare and the scope of the damage they
cause so broad that ordinary insurance schemes and legal routines for
resolving disputes do not fit the problems they pose. Dealing with
problems of this sort requires governmental planning and actions.
One cannot, for example, expect the deterrence associated with the
threat of tort litigation to lead to adequate precautions against harms
that may be caused by rare, high consequence events even if given
enough time, certain rare harms are almost inevitable. Short, personal
time horizons ("There may be an accident, but most likely not in my
lifetime."), psychological denial ("I wouldn't live here if I thought I
might be killed in an earthquake."), and moral hazard ("If there is a
catastrophe, the damage will be so great that the government will bail
me out.") make it almost inevitable that insufficient precaution will be
taken. Thus, to prevent or minimize the harms associated with poten-
tially catastrophic rare events, the government, instead of relying on
actor self interest and deterrence, must turn to planning and regula-
tion. Examples include laws that forbid building or rebuilding in vul-
nerable flood plains, requirements that buildings can withstand
earthquakes of a certain magnitude, and mandates that oil be trans-
ported in double hulled tankers.
Advance planning should also include compensation when severe
risks are realized. Insurance schemes can be developed to allow first-
party compensation for much of the damage caused by events like
floods and earthquakes that are severe and unpredictable, but, over
time, inevitable in some regions. Insurance may be mandatory in cer-
tain situations or, as with flood insurance, costs may be subsidized by
the government both as an incentive to buy the insurance and as a way
to make it affordable.8 6 But such subsidies have a cost, for they en-
courage risky behavior, like building and rebuilding in flood plains.
Alternatively, governments can establish insurance-like compensation
systems that are not premium based. Taxation may be used to estab-
lish funds that can pay for damages that although locally and tempo-
86. Flood insurance in certain areas may, for all practical purposes, be mandated even though
the government does not require it since adequate insurance may be required to secure a
mortgage.
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rally uncertain are, over the long run, almost certain to occur, and
these systems may relate to the risk those taxed incur. For example,
single- and double-bottomed tankers that travel in U.S. waters might
be taxed at different rates, both to encourage a shift to double-bot-
tomed tankers and to accumulate funds to help clean up and compen-
sate for major oil spills. Taxes might be levied on those who choose to
build in known flood plains or on earthquake prone land, both to dis-
courage such choices and to establish funds that can compensate for
the harms that will arise when the known risk is realized. 87
If insurance or other funds were created for the benefit of those
willing to take serious but rarely realized risks, and if the risks were in
fact realized, compensation from the funds should be on a no-fault
basis. So long as the fund is sufficient to pay reasonable sums for the
damages suffered, tort actions, perhaps with an exception for gross
negligence that exacerbates injuries, should ordinarily be barred by
those seeking fund payouts.88 This does not guarantee freedom from
litigation, but it is notable that post-Katrina, insurance companies
have paid out over forty-one billion dollars for damages suffered,
while the tort system is lumbering along with few recoveries in sight.89
Both the litigation and non-litigation costs of determining payment
eligibility can be further reduced if no coverage exclusions are allowed
for event-caused harms, except perhaps for damage exacerbation due
clearly reckless behavior. 90 For example, many of those harmed by
Katrina, particularly near the Mississippi coast, had homeowners poli-
cies that covered wind and wind-driven water damage but not damage
from flooding. Not surprisingly, disputes between home owners and
adjusters and subsequent court cases arose over whether water dam-
age should be attributed to wind-driven water or to flooding. Yet,
87. There may be creative ways to impose such taxes both to diminish resistance to them and
to make them easier to bear. For example, an earthquake or flood fund tax might be levied only
when property changes hands and then on only a portion of any capital gain. If this were done, a
building owner would almost always have the funds needed to pay the tax. The existence of the
tax would also lower the value of property subject to the tax, thus making it easier for prospec-
tive purchasers to factor the risks they are taking into their purchase decisions.
88. Whether there should be an option to pursue recovery through tort action in lieu of turn-
ing to the fund may depend on the risk covered and involves a level of detail beyond the scope of
this Article.
89. See Stelter, supra note 74.
90. I don't believe that simple negligence should justify recovery exclusions because in the
course of an emergency many people might act in ways that in retrospect look careless. Litigat-
ing what was and was not careful behavior given the circumstances is likely to be costly, and the
threat of such litigation could be a negotiating tactic on the part of insurers and fund managers.
Moreover, to the extent that deterrence requires the rational consideration of options, even if
knowledge of the costs of negligence were widespread, it would probably be of low salience in
the kinds of situations discussed in this Article.
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from both the home owner's and society's point of view, the natural
mechanism behind the harm suffered doesn't matter. Regardless of
mechanism, Katrina was responsible for the harm, and the home-
owner's need for compensation is the same. Moreover, both sources
of harm are actuarially predictable and thus amenable to incorpora-
tion in insurance rates.
Widespread insurance or insurance-like funds would enhance com-
pensation in predictable disasters and minimize transaction costs. To-
gether with appropriate regulation such schemes might be more than
adequate substitutes for the deterrence function of tort law. The tort
goal of deterrence is to minimize the cost of accidents. From a social
cost point of view, what matters is the degree of cost minimization and
not the mechanism of minimization unless that mechanism imposes its
own costs. The challenge is to establish insurance and regulatory re-
gimes that work to minimize future accidents as well as or better than
the tort system without imposing greater costs than those that attend
the threat of tort liability and actions to recover in tort.91 This chal-
lenge should be easy to meet in the case of statistically inevitable but
low probability events. Under the current system, the long run bene-
fits of acting voluntarily to ameliorate the consequences of unlikely
events are likely to be trumped by more salient and immediately felt
short term costs even if, in retrospect, the failure to take certain pre-
cautions would be regarded as negligent. Moreover, we should be
concerned not just with reducing the cost of accidents, which entail
some kind of human agency, but with reducing the costs of other
tragic incidents. Here, tort law offers no benefits. But regulation,
such as mandated earthquake proofing or compulsory insurance, can,
by increasing the up-front costs of taking risks, discourage unjustified
risk taking behavior.
One problem with insurance systems and compensation funds is
that caps are typically placed on recoveries. Open-ended liability
often appears intolerable, but in the case of widespread disasters an
insurance or other fund might be exhausted before full compensation
is paid. If, as with Price-Anderson, the fund must be constituted by
those who may create the eventually realized risk, recourse to the
class of risk creators for replenishment of the fund seems like a natu-
ral and justified step. In the case of Price-Anderson, such contingent
liability would work to guarantee adequate compensation for those
harmed; it would increase the deterrent value of the regime, and it
91. For example, defensive medicine is thought to be a cost imposed by the threat of tort
compensation while lowered incentives to take care (moral hazard) are thought to be a cost of
insurance schemes.
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would enhance the moral justification for the program. But without a
cap, those required to provide compensation under the Act would
wonder what they would be getting out of a post-accident collective
responsibility scheme beyond a guarantee that any losses they create
will be shared by the entire industry. Individual companies might well
be better off under a tort regime, for then they would, in theory, have
to pay nothing unless their negligence could be shown, and the need
to prove negligence would in the usual case allow them to bargain for
settlements below the cost of the harm they caused. So caps seem not
only characteristic of but also necessary for acceptable insurance and
related schemes. The issue is the adequacy and fairness of the cap. It
is on these dimensions that Price-Anderson, arguably, falls down.
The current Price-Anderson cap no doubt reflects the lobbying
strength of the nuclear power industry far more than a Congressional
concern that a higher cap or no cap might force some reactor compa-
nies into bankruptcy and potentially destroy the industry. But were
Congress acting uninfluenced by lobbyists, at some point the fiscal im-
plications of forcing all companies to pay the total costs of a catastro-
phe which occurred at one of them would be a legitimate concern.
There are, perhaps, other options. For example, Congress could man-
date that, if damages exceeded a monetary cap, further payment could
take the form of issuing stock to victims up to the point where the
market value of the stock would fall below a certain low level. Such
"in kind" payment would provide additional funds to victims, would
not require the industry to divert further cash from its business activi-
ties, and would give a company's shareholders an incentive to ensure
not just that their company was taking exceptional care, but also that
the industry as a whole was well regulated and the likelihood of a
serious accident at any nuclear plant was minimal.92
However, as the cases we have used for examples suggest, moving
from a fault-based to a no-fault compensation regime inevitably
slights the moral dimension of tort law. There are real costs here in
terms of victim satisfaction and system legitimacy, as the work of
92. Nothing is costless. One might argue that the existence of such a scheme would hamper
the industry by making it more difficult for it to raise funds through stock offerings. But the
same features that lead people to downplay such risks as living near a nuclear plant should also
work to make them downplay the risks of investing in one. Thus the costs of such a scheme to
capital acquisition might be considerably less than a rational actor analysis would indicate. They
would also, of course, be less to the extent that potential shareholders felt the nuclear industry as
a whole was well-regulated but not over-regulated, which is a virtue of the scheme. Since it is
reasonable to suppose that investors would know more about the situation of the company they
propose to invest in than they do about other companies, the cap on stock contributions to the
fund might be different for the company that was responsible for the accident, at least if its
negligence could be shown.
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Landsman and Hadfield indicate. 93 I believe that these costs are
worth trading off if, in return, we achieve the goals of greater and
more certain compensation and lower transaction costs. There is,
however, as Katrina's aftermath reveals, at least one circumstance
where attention to the moral dimension of compensation schemes
does not conflict with goals of increased compensation and lower
transaction costs, and, indeed, where ignoring morality subverts these
other goals. Here, I am referring to the patchwork of rules and regu-
lations that allow governments to avoid paying the costs of their own
carelessness. Katrina would have caused great devastation in New
Orleans regardless of the quality of the city's defenses, but the costs
were increased many fold by the shortsightedness and negligence of
the Army Corps of Engineers in building canals and constructing lev-
ees and by actions of other state and federal agencies, both before and
after the hurricane struck. Determining which governmental actions
escape demands for legal relief under the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, the specific provisions of the Flood Control Act of 1928, and the
exceptions to tort immunity found in the FTCA has itself been the
subject of considerable lengthy litigation. To the extent the govern-
ment avoids paying the costs of its negligence, it will not only be
avoiding a moral obligation to pay for harms it caused, but it will also
be concentrating substantial costs on a relatively small group of vic-
tims rather than spreading them through the country as a whole.
This does not mean that the exceptions built into the F'CA or pro-
vided for by other statutes or common law principles are necessarily
bad. The FTCA exceptions, in particular, have the benefit of insulat-
ing the government from lawsuits when discretionary decisions taken
with care and in good faith result in harm and, only in hindsight, look
careless. Perhaps the government should compensate for such harms
regardless, but this is not what tort law demands. However, when it is
clear that decisions, whether sovereign and discretionary or not, can
be proved poorly judged when made, the case for protecting the gov-
ernment from tort liability crumbles. At best, the case against govern-
ment compensation is reduced to an argument that the law should not
constrain the polity to pay out untold billions of dollars regardless of
whether those who would be compensated have a moral claim to that
money and need compensation to be made whole. This is a hard-
hearted justification to say the least.
Thus, if recovery for low probability/high consequence events is to
proceed in a tort framework, I suggest that some of the protections
93. See generally Landsman, supra note 53; see also Hadfield, supra note 51.
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the government enjoys when it is sued should be removed. In particu-
lar, when governmental carelessness is clearly responsible for substan-
tial harms, the government should not be able to impose defenses that
avoid liability by virtue of its special status. In giving up its special
status, the government might, however, demand something in return.
Because of the danger of hindsight bias or an undue willingness to
reach into the government's deep pockets, as well as good reasons
why we want to keep the government from being bogged down in
litigation, the government might require that its lack of care be shown
by a higher standard than the preponderance of the evidence, and it
might require actions against to be brought in the Court of Claims or
other specialized tribunals as conditions for waiving its special de-
fenses. A related reform contingent on the waiving of special govern-
mental defenses might be to require a single trial that establishes both
governmental liability for an event and a best estimate of the total
costs for which the governmental is responsible. Payment of the
amount thus established might go not to separate plaintiffs or a plain-
tiff's committee, but into a fund that would be distributed under the
guidance of a special master as the 9/11 disbursements were.
These suggestions are intended for incidents that, although rare, oc-
cur through understood mechanisms and, over time, appear more or
less inevitable. They apply less well to events like 9/11 which cannot
be anticipated except at the broadest level of generality. Although it
was possible before 9/11 to say with some confidence that there will be
a terrorist attack on the United States, 94 that is like saying that the
weather will cause havoc in some part of the country. It may be true,
but this knowledge is not conducive to well-calibrated insurance
schemes, 95 and it is difficult to anticipate the mechanism of harm to
consequence amelioration through regulation. It is possible that in
such instances the best we can do is to rely on ad hoc political solu-
tions, as we did in 9/11, and to recognize that without political solu-
tions we will have to make due with a civil law regime that is certain to
prove inadequate.
94. At least one such attack, a plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport, had been thwarted by a
combination of lucky circumstances and an attentive border control agent. There had also been
an earlier attack on the World Trade Center which had not brought down the towers. See Laura
Mansnerus, Man is Guilty in Bomb Plot at Millennium, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2001, at B6; David
Johnston, Fugitive in Trade Center Blast is Caught and Returned to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1995, at Al; see also Neil MacFarquhar, In Bombing Trial, a Deluge of Details, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 1995, at 40.
95. National health insurance would, of course, help pay for the medical costs of those injured
regardless of why the injury occurred.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As I said at the outset, I thought the task set for me was more diffi-
cult than that set for other conference participants because I was
charged with discussing reforms that would allow the legal system to
deal effectively with incidents that were not only very costly but also
often difficult, if not impossible, to imagine. To anchor this task in
more than just my imagination, I chose to focus on recent incidents
that seemed most like the kind I was charged with examining, and to
explore how the civil justice system coped with them. Looking at the
four cases I have used as examples, I think we can conclude that in the
face of rare catastrophic events no minor changes to the current tort
system will come close to achieving all the goals that tort law aims at.
Developing alternative systems of adjudication and compensation
may allow us to do better, but when faced with unexpected events that
create unprecedented harms we should not expect to achieve perfec-
tion, or anything close to it. It may be that the best we can do is
somehow to muddle through. If it is any comfort, muddling through
has worked for humans as a race since the dawn of evolution.
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